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Abstract
Users buy compatible IOT devices from different
brands with an expectation that their cooperation
is smooth, but while function may superficially look
friendly, cohabitation can subversively cause early bat-
tery depletion in competitor devices.
The Wi-Fi Direct standard was introduced with the
intention of simplifying peer-to-peer connections in
home applications while helping devices to save power
through centralization of effort into a single group
owner device negotiated on start-up. Attacks on the
group formation stage can be based on manipulating a
victim device to frequently end up being assigned the
group owner function, thereby depleting its batteries at
faster rates than its peer devices. This manipulation is
made easy by the group formation mechanism adopted
by the standard.
We show that group formation procedures could be bet-
ter secured with features ensuring fairness by relying
on commitments and by learning about the behavior
observed for peer devices in the past. Simulations are
used to quantify the resistance achieved against several
attack strategies.
Introduction
Mechanisms to mitigate attacks on devices in smart
homes and other IoT applications are introduced based
on learning of peer behavior from sequences of out-
comes from Wi-Fi Direct group formation processes,
and by enforcing fairness with cryptographic commit-
ments. The recent Wi-Fi Direct standard was devel-
oped as an alternative to the previous Wi-Fi modes, of
which the most well known are the infrastructure mode
and the adhoc mode. While the infrastructure mode
only allows devices to communicate in the presence of
an Access Point (AP), the adhoc Wi-Fi mode causes
intensive power consumption by devices as they have
to continuously advertise themselves. In comparison,
the new Wi-Fi Direct mode comes with standard set-up
procedures, after which only one device needs to con-
sume power for broadcasting maintenance signals. This
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device is called group owner (GO), and it is appointed
via a negotiation protocol.
Motivation Devices in a smart home may come
from different vendors and are allowed to communicate
for achieving higher level tasks, such as regulating light
and sound levels in a larger space. Devices from some
vendors may exploit devices of a competitor by coaxing
them into taking a GO function in a disproportionate
way with the intention to deplete their batteries
faster. This in turn will cause a negative impact on
the user perception about those competitors. More
dangerously, a device that has been taken over by an
attacker can be used as a proxy in an attack on the
batteries of a more sensitive device, such as a door-
keeper, by similarly manipulating it into becoming GO.
Definition A False Friends Battery Depletion (FFBD)
attack is when a victim device is intentionally induced
into depleting its battery by volunteering services.
E.g., this could occur while attackers disproportion-
ately avoid such duties, or do not need those services.
Technology The standardized negotiation protocol
does not account for security attacks. Each device con-
figures a level of preference for becoming GO, as an
integer Intent Value (IV) between 0 and 15. A pref-
erence of 15 communicates a requirement of being GO,
without which the negotiation fails. In case both prefer-
ences are between 0 and 14, the device with the highest
value becomes GO. For the case where preferences are
equal, the contacting device includes a Tie-Breaker Bit
(TBB) that is supposed to be flipped in subsequent re-
quests. The bit is flipped in the reply, and the device
sending the TBB 1 will become GO. Finally, devices
can abandon the group formation for any reason.
The standard itself does not specify how devices
should select their GO preferences, and there are no
mechanisms to verify or ensure that TBBs flip between
sessions, as recommended. A device that wants to avoid
being GO, can set IV to 0, and also ground the TBB.
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Approach To address False Friend Battery Depletion
attacks we propose mechanisms based on learning peer
profiles from their behavior over time and using secure
bit commitments for flipping TBBs, to improve the de-
tection of manipulating devices.
In the next section we introduce background about
Wi-Fi Direct and its group formation sub-protocol, as
well as on the various competing techniques for secure
bit commitment and coin flipping. After describing re-
lated work that focuses on other attacks on Wi-Fi Di-
rect and group formation, we will delve into strategies
for learning and adjusting to attacking peers. In the
section Exploiting Commitments we describe the pro-
posed integration of fair bit flipping techniques into the
group formation protocol. We end by describing ex-
perimental results based on simulations, confirming the
robustness brought by the proposed techniques with re-
spect to various attack scenarios.
Background
This section introduces the recent Wi-Fi Direct technol-
ogy, focusing on its group formation subprotocol, and
research on intelligent strategies for power consumption
reduction, as well as power consumption attacks.
Wi-Fi Direct
The 802.11 standard allows vendors to extend the speci-
fication through their Information Element (IE) Frame,
as we also propose here. The IE has a general format
consisting of one-octet element ID field, one-byte length
field, three-bytes OUI field, one-byte OUI type and up
to 251 bytes of payload (IEEE 2012). Wi-Fi Direct
defines the P2P IE Frame using attributes which are
composed of a one-byte attribute ID, a two-bytes at-
tribute length, and attribute data. Multiple attributes
can be placed within a single IE Frame, and compliant
vendors are required to ignore attribute IDs they do not
understand (including attribute IDs marked as reserved
in the current standard). New attributes can be used
for extensions as proposed here.
This protocol allows communication among peers
within a single group (Alliance 2014). The roles of GOs
and clients are defined during the group formation pro-
cess. The P2P GO implements an AP-like functional-
ity (Altaweel, Stoleru, and Gu 2017), with maintenance
and advertisement performed through periodically sent
beacon frames, increasing its power consumption. After
the election process, the role of GO or client remains
unchanged during the entire group session. When the
GO owner, for any reason, leaves the group, the devices
become disconnected.
Group formation process
There are three methods for creating a group: standard,
persistent, and autonomous. However, our focus in this
paper is only on the standard group formation method.
Figure 1: P2P Device discovery process
Figure 2: Group owner negotiation process
Standard Group formation The device discovery
phase consists of two sub-phases: scan and find. During
the scan phase, devices try to find other devices/groups
or Wi-Fi networks, also locating the best channels for
establishing a group. Devices cannot reply to request
frames when they are involved in scanning. During the
find phase, the device selects one of the channels 1,
6, or 11 in the 2.4GHz or 5GHz bands, as Listening
Channel. After this, the device alternates between a
scanning phase by sending Probe Requests in each of
these channels; and a listen state, in which it listens on
a channel for Probe Requests frame in order to respond
with Probe Response frames. The discovery phase al-
gorithm is illustrated in Figure 1.
Once a device has found another device that it wants
to contact, and which is not yet involved in a group,
it starts the so called Group Owner Negotiation phase.
The details regarding this three way handshake com-
munication are illustrated in Figure 2. When the target
device is already in a group, the owner of that group is
contacted, skipping the GO negotiation phase.
Power consumption
Since the GO device might be battery powered, its
energy consumption is critical (Yoo et al. 2014; Liao,
Cheng, and Domb 2017). To help reduce consumption,
the protocol can define an availability period of the GO,
called Client Traffic Window. Power management for
GO consists of delivery mechanisms defined for Power
Save and Wi-Fi multimedia power save (WMM-PS),
but there also exist power saving mechanisms that al-
low for a GO to be sometimes absent: the Opportunistic
Power Save (OPS), and the Notice of Absence (NoA).
Secure Commitments
The breaking of ties between peers with identical intent
value to become GO is performed in the P2P Direct
standard by trusting the contacting peer to locally gen-
erate a random bit. However, this trust is not rational
in the light of FFBD attacks.
One of the solutions we propose is to use secure coin
flipping over the network. Many of these techniques
employ bit commitment protocols. An example of such
a technique is the simple bit commitment protocol in
the random oracle model (Camenisch et al. 2018). As-
sume an agent A wants to commit to a bit with value
b. A generates a sufficiently large random number R,
and then publishes the value c = H(R, b) where H
is a secure message digest function such as SHA-2 or
Whirlpool (ISO 2004). The commitment is binding, in
the sense that it is difficult for A to find other val-
ues for R and b that generate the same commitment
c. If R is large enough, the commitments is also hid-
ing in the sense that an attacker would not be able
to efficiently try sufficiently many values of R and b
in order to find one that matches c. Bit commitment
techniques have also been proposed based of pseudo-
random number generators as well as on other security
concepts (Naor 1990).
Coin flipping over the network (Blum 1983) by two
agents A and B can be performed by having A commit
to a bit bA before B publicly discloses a bit bB . When
A receives bB then it also reveals bA. The result of the
coin flip is the exclusive OR of the bits, bA ⊗ bB .
Related Work
Due to the open access, reduced security infrastructure,
and broadcast nature of communication, Wi-Fi direct is
threatened by different cyber-attacks (Shen et al. 2016).
Two commonly addressed attacks are Impersonation
and Denial of Service (DoS).
Impersonation. The attacker can impersonate a MAC
address and then change the Wi-Fi channel. When a
device attempts to join a legitimate network, it can be
deceived into connecting to a device of an attacker.
DoS. The aim of the DoS attack is to overload or eventu-
ally completely crash a system or network, by flooding it
with useless traffic. Many smart home devices are bat-
tery operated, thus flooding these devices with requests
can lead to an energy depletion attack, preventing le-
gitimate users from having access to the system (Maraj
et al. 2017). The battery exhaustion attack is a classic
DoS attack which tries to reduce the battery life of mo-
bile devices (Nash et al. 2005), in particular to reduce
the battery of the GO. Battery exhaustion attacks have
been studied in Wireless Sensors Networks and Internet
of Things (Raymond and Midkiff 2008), as well as on
battery-powered mobile devices (Martin et al. 2004).
Learning Peer Behavior
Detecting and handling graciously a FFBD attack re-
quires complex reasoning or a robust classifier. Design-
ing a set of logic rules leading to a rigid classification
of a peer as attacker is possible but fragile due to un-
certainty. A probabilistic classifier implemented as a
Bayesian Network or an Artificial Neural Network can
more robustly be used to associate a FFBD attack to a
posterior probability, given a history of communication.
Once an attack probability is associated with each
peer profile, this can be communicated to the device
owner (or manufacturer). Further, automatic accep-
tance or rejection of a connection as GO with a peer
can be made using a utilitarian approach, based on the
current batteries levels, a fairness measure, and a pa-
rameter of risk adversity that can be configured.
We propose to consider that a GO device has pre-
maturely quit a group if it either quits before the end
of a group formation negotiation where it would end
up as GO, or it quits before the group can be used to
perform any concrete application-level task.
Let us now describe the investigated solution based
on a Bayesian Network. The module is assumed to
maintain a profile for each peer with which it creates
groups. The profile stores statistics used as features of
the learning process. These statistics can be maintained
over a sliding time window (a month, in our experi-
ments). To maintain the sliding window, the statistics
for a time window can be assembled dynamically from
smaller buckets (we use one bucket per day), such that
for each new bucket added, the oldest bucket is removed
from the totals. Identified features, computed by a de-
vice D for each peer over the sliding window, are:
• iGO: percentage of GO negotiations with peer where
D was elected GO. The possible values, as used in our
experiments, are: low (VL) for 0-25%, small (VS) for
25-40%, average (VA) for 40-60%, above (VB) for 60-
75%, and high (VH) for 75-100%.
• pGO: percentage of GO negotiations where peer is
GO and quits prematurely, discretized as for iGO.
• tGO: The percentage of communication time with
peer in which D was GO.
• Data: number of GO negotiations with the peer.
The domain of Data is discretized as ”insufficient
knowledge” (I) below 10 rounds, ”some knowl-
edge” (S) below 100 rounds, and ”reasonably in-
formed” (R).
The above features are used by the device learning mod-
ule to output peer characterization values:
• False Friend Battery Depletion attack ignorance: the
current ignorance of the device as to whether there
exists sufficient data to judge whether the peer is an
FFBD attacker, in the sense of the Dempster-Shafer
theory (Shafer 1976). It is mapped from the values
of the Data feature.
• Peer Fairness (PF ): how fair has been so far the GO
time distribution with this peer. It is estimated as
Figure 3: Bayesian Network.
Data=R
AT P(VL) P(VS) P(VA) P(VB) P(VH )
ASA 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.45
AMA 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.45 0.2
AF 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1
ABA 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1
AAL 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
Data=S
AT P(VL) P(VS) P(VA) P(VB) P(VH )
ASA 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.22 0.36
AMA 0.13 0.13 0.20 0.34 0.20
AF 0.13 0.20 0.34 0.20 0.13
ABA 0.20 0.34 0.20 0.13 0.13
AAL 0.36 0.22 0.14 0.14 0.14
Data=I
AT P(VL) P(VS) P(VA) P(VB) P(VH )
ASA 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.24 0.25
AMA 0.15 0.15 0.23 0.24 0.23
AF 0.15 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.15
ABA 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.15 0.15
AAL 0.25 0.24 0.17 0.17 0.17
Figure 4: Conditional Probability Tables of the leaf
nodes, built as a definition of the attacker types.
the percentage of communication time with peer in
which D was GO, namely tGO. E.g., ratios below .6
are considered fair.
• False Friend Battery Depletion attack (AT) prob-
ability: the probability associated with being un-
der an FFBD attack from peer, estimated using the
Bayesian Network in Figure 3, where the thick mar-
gin circles are evidence variables, and the conditional
probability tables (CPT) are shown in Figure 4.
FFBD attacks can be at different intensity. The at-
tacker models represented by the multi-value random
variable AT, are classify as (see Figure 4):
• ”Strong attacker” (ASA), where the percentage of ne-
gotiations where peer attacks is high (VH)
• ”Medium attacker” (AMA), where the percentage of
negotiations where peer attacks is above average (VB)
• ”Fair” (AF ), where the percentage of negotiations
where peer attacks is average (VA)
• ”Better than average” (ABA), where the percentage
of negotiations where peer attacks is small (VS)
• ”Altruist” (AAL), where the percentage of negotia-
tions where peer attacks is very low (VL)
The prior probability of other devices being attackers
can depend on the manufacturer of the other devices.
In our experiments this multivalued random variable
prior is the vector of 5 values [0.15, 0.2, 0.45, 0.1, 0.1],
and in practice can be adjusted based on inputs from
the end-used concerning their happiness with the rel-
ative battery performance of the device. The FFBD
attack probability for a peer is checked each time the
device becomes GO, and if PF > 0.6, computing:
Figure 5: Proposed Vendor IE frame format
P (AT |iGO, pGO, tGO,Data)
= αP (iGO, pGO, tGO|AT,Data)P (AT )
Exploiting Commitments
In addressing FFBD attacks, solutions have to consider
the trade-off between efficiency and security. The in-
troduction of a fair coin-flipping mechanism provides
a learning component with strong evidence of manip-
ulation intention on the part of one’s peer in a group
owner negotiation, when this quits prematurely. The
coin-flipping solution based on the random oracle model
is a choice with small computation requirements.
While the IV value of a device may depend on the
peer with each it communicates, the TBB its supposed
to be independent and a commitment to it can be ad-
vertised in Probe Request frames. A tentative IV value
can also be advertised with the probe, but it is under-
stood that the device may change the value based on
the peer identity. In a version that we propose along
with our learning strategies, each peer A of the GO ne-
gotiation will commit to its current TBBA by sending
its commitment H(RA|IVA|TBBA) inside a new type
of Information Element broadcast with each Probe Re-
quest, called Tie Breaker Bit Commitment (TBBC) IE.
The number of bytes of overhead required for a SHA-
256 hash is 38, namely 32 bytes for the hash and 6 bytes
for the IE header, if the message is implemented as a
Vendor IE (see Figure 5). Instead, the overhead is 35
bytes if the message uses one of the Reserved P2P at-
tributes. Further, for compatibility, the GO Negotiation
Request may contain a random TBB′A that is not corre-
lated with the TBBA committed to. This adds 4 bytes:
3 as overhead for a P2P attribute header, and 1 byte of
payload for the TBB bit.
The device B deciding the identity of the GO will
then use as tie breaking value the result TBB of the
computation TBB = TBBA XOR TBBB . Then, de-
vice B opens its commitment using the GO negotia-
tion response to which it can add a P2P IE attribute
for opening the commitment by stating its RB . It will
also communicate the IVB actually used in the decision.
Differences between this IV , IVB and past values are
also reliable features usable by the learning system to
build a profile for device B.
An advantage of this solution is that the need of GO
negotiation confirmation may be reduced and eventu-
ally removed from the protocol, shortening the setup
delay in future versions of P2P Direct, which will im-
prove its usability to applications sensible to start-up
latency, such as vehicle-to-vehicle communication.
Figure 6: Proposed probe and negotiation process
Figure 7: Commitment in the GO negotiation
Commitment In GO Negotiation An alternative
approach is to integrate the TBB commitment fully in
the GO negotiation process. The device A integrates
the commitment H(RA|IVA|TBBA) in the GO nego-
tiation request. Further, the device B generates both
sets of responses for the cases where a GO is assigned
to device A and to device B. Both outcomes are pre-
sented in the GO negotiation response, together with
TBBB and IVB . In the end, the device A returns the
GO negotiation confirmation with the selected result,
and opening the commitments for TBBA and IVA.
While commitments do not allow cheating with
TBBs, attackers can still quit prematurely.
Experiments
A simulator was implemented and used to run exper-
iments with 2, 5, and 10 devices. Each device is as-
sumed to start with a battery that can last 365 days
in the non-communicating mode. The simulation as-
sumes that the non-communicating mode uses 1 energy
unit per second. The client mode uses an additional en-
ergy unit per second. The GO mode uses 10 additional
energy units per second, besides the unit used by the
non-communicating mode. The IV is always set to 0 to
focus on the tie-breaking algorithm. In all the simula-
tions, the device 0 may be a victim of FFBD attacks
by a subset of the remaining devices. The efficiency of
the tested algorithms is computed as the time until the
victim battery depletes. As expected, the battery lasts
longer when the victim defends itself by either reject-
ing connections from detected attackers classified using
the Bayesian Network (“L”), using secure bit commit-
ment (“C”), or both (L+C), rather than the standard
method (“S”). Each point is averaged over 10 runs per-
formed with different random seed values. Simulations
Figure 8: Effect of various TBB attack strengths
Figure 9: Effect of ratio of attackers with 5 devices
where the attackers also quit prematurely, rejecting as-
signed GO roles and retrying connections are marked
with “R”. A victim drops a GO Request from peers de-
tected as attackers, if their peer fairness is PF > 60%.
Figure 8 describes the effect of the TBB attack
strength (percentage of manipulated TBBs). In this set
of experiments, there are only 2 devices, namely the
victim and the FFBD attacker. For each simulation,
the attacker follows a repeated communication sched-
ule with groups lasting for 1 minute every 6 minutes.
As noticed, the attacks are detected by the Bayesian
Network starting at the strength of 30%, while com-
mitments can enforce fair behavior.
The Figures 9 and 10 describe the performance with
5 and 10 devices, respectively. The devices follow a re-
peated communication schedule with groups lasting for
1 hour every 12 hours. For these sets of experiments, a
fraction of the devices act as attackers by manipulating
the TBB in each group formation process that they ini-
tiate. It is also observed that the battery of the victim
will last longer with method L and many attackers since
the victim device will detect and avoid unfairly com-
municating with attackers in GO mode, saving more
battery.
Figure 11 describes the effect of the R attack strength
(percentage of negotiations where the attacker quits
prematurely when becoming GO). All points are com-
puted at a TBB attack strength of 50%, while the R
attack strength varies. While it is observed that, as
Figure 10: Effect of ratio of attackers with 10 devices
Figure 11: Effect of various R attack strengths
expected, secure bit commitment cannot defend from a
strong R attack, learning allows for longer battery life
of victims as they drop communication with attackers.
Future Work Developing a utility driven behavior
for devices is the next logical extension of this work.
The utility that a device is expected to associate to a
state of the world is basically the utility it contributes
to the brand of the manufacturer. This utility reflects
the way in which the profits of the manufacturer are
impacted by the performance of its devices, through
their effect on the image of the brand:
• Customer happiness with respect to battery life.
• Customer happiness related to device inter-
operability and availability.
These two components of utility provide incentives to-
wards contradictory behaviors, and the optimal trade-
off depends on their actual values, relation that can be
obtained as input from the end-customer.
To avoid letting an attacker deplete a victim’s battery
by keeping it as GO after connecting to it while it was
already GO as a result of a negotiation with a third
party, as future work we will also investigate deadlines
after which GOs decides to close a group. The deadlines
can be set with an alarm started at the GO negotiation
time, or when the first client quits the group.
Conclusions
The False Friend Battery Depletion (FFBB) attack is
identified as a potential hazard against devices in smart
homes, where battery-powered victims are coaxed into
volunteering to support attacker devices, as intensive
power consuming group owners, reducing their own
availability to end-users and damaging their brand rep-
utation. We address FFBD attacks based on manipu-
lating TBBs and on premature quitting. A set of so-
lutions is proposed for addressing FFBD attacks, using
secure bit commitments, learning statistical profiles of
peers, and classifying them using Bayesian Networks.
The solutions based on secure bit commitments prove
to be very robust, but would require changes in the Wi-
Fi Direct standard group formation protocols, changes
which are unlikely to occur soon given that many de-
vices already support the current standard. The results
based solely on learning statistical profiles and detec-
tion using Bayesian Networks were shown to also work
very well, being a valid alternative where attacks are
detected and automatically denied.
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